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ABSTRACT 
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act introduced radical changes 
to US immigration policy. It abolished the country of origin quotas which had been in place 
since the 1920s and it made family reunification the principal criterion for admission. This 
legislative change was followed by a steep upward trend in total immigration and by a 
dramatic shift in the source country composition away from Europe and towards Asia and 
Latin America. Yet this was not what those who framed the legislation expected, and the 
results are seen by most observers as unintended consequences. This paper asks if and how 
the 1965 Act transformed American immigration. The results were partly due to the pre-
existing legislation and partly to the admission of immigrants outside the terms of the Act. 
But much of it was due to the Act itself, and specifically to the pattern of chain migration 
that followed from it. Econometric estimates indicate that the poorer the source country, 
the greater the effect of the existing stock of immigrants on the subsequent inflow from 
that source.  
JEL Codes: F22, J15, J61, N32. 
Keywords: Immigration Policy; Immigration Multiplier.  
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Introduction 
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act are often seen as a decisive break in 
American immigration policy and one with far reaching consequences. The most important 
change was to replace the national origins quotas, which heavily favoured British, German 
and Irish immigrants, with a less discriminatory system. Named after its sponsors, the Hart-
Celler Act amended the 1952 Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, which had 
largely reaffirmed the national origins system that had been in place since the early 1920s. 
Thirteen years later, against the background of the civil rights movement and with a 
sweeping victory for the Democrats in the 1964 election, this system was finally overturned 
and the United States opened its doors to immigrants from all over the world. The decades 
following its enactment saw a dramatic rise in the total number of immigrants and an 
equally dramatic switch in the source country composition away from Europe towards Asia 
and Latin America. To many observers the 1965 Act was a defining moment that radically 
transformed American immigration and provided the foundation for all that followed.  
Yet in some respects the 1965 Act was a modest reform--at least in the minds of 
contemporary legislators. Thus President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law with the 
following remark: “This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not 
affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives, or really add 
importantly to either our wealth or our power.”1 For him the Act was a symbolic rather 
than a substantive reform. Similarly, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), one of the Act’s 
main advocates commented in the early stages of its progress through Congress that: "The 
bill will not flood our cities with immigrants. It will not upset the ethnic mix of our society. 
It will not relax the standards of admission. It will not cause American workers to lose their 
jobs."2 Of course comments such as these may simply have been designed to reassure 
anxious constituents and assure the bill a smooth passage through both houses. 
Although not all contemporaries were as sanguine as this, historians have generally taken 
the view that the legislators in 1965 genuinely believed that the increase in immigrant 
numbers would be moderate and that shifts in the source country composition would be 
gradual. According to David Reimers (1983, p. 10) “Congress did not intend to make 
radical changes in immigration patterns when it amended the McCarran-Walter Act, nor 
did the lawmakers mean to increase immigration substantially.” Roger Daniels (2004, p. 
135), remarks that: “Since the new law so resembled the old, it is not surprising that few 
observers, if any, expected major change to result.” He goes on to comment that: “Clearly 
the 1965 law has not worked in a way that either its proponents or its opponents 
                                                          
1
 President Johnson's remarks at the signing of the immigration bill, Liberty Island, New York, October 3, 1965, 
from LBJ archive at: http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/651003.asp.  
2
 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 10, 
1965. pp. 1-3, quoted in Centre for Immigration studies (1995).   
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expected” (2004, p. 139). Similarly, Aristide Zollberg comments that: “while the lawmakers 
did intend to eliminate the immigration system’s discriminatory features, notably as they 
affected Asians and West Indians, they did not anticipate that incoming flows would 
expand as much as they did, nor that non-European sources would become as dominant 
(2006, p. 337-8).3 
The ensuing changes in the scale and structure of immigration have provoked controversy. 
There has been an ongoing debate about the impact of the forty-year surge in immigration 
on the employment and earnings of low-skilled native-born workers. Some economists have 
also argued that that the low relative earnings of immigrants, their slow assimilation, and 
increasing welfare dependence in the 1970s and 1980s was a direct consequence of the 
compositional shifts set in train by the 1965 Act (Briggs, 1984; Smith and Edmonston, 1997; 
Borjas, 1999; Hanson, 2005).  Others have pointed to the wider social and cultural effects, 
both positive and negative, of increasing ethnic diversity (Alba and Nee, 2003; Huntington, 
2004; Bean and Stevens, 2003; Rumbaut and Portes, 2006). To quote one of these “the 
Immigration Act of 1965 has probably had, in the long run, an impact on American society as 
deep as the initially more acclaimed civil rights laws of the decade” (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 
174). While much attention has been paid to the putative effects of the 1965 reforms, much 
less attention has been given to exactly how, and through what mechanisms, the 1965 Act 
changed the face of United States immigration.  
So what did the 1965 Act actually do and how did it shape the subsequent patterns of 
immigration? In this paper I first examine how the 1965 Act differed from the pre-existing 
legislation, and how its provisions were influenced by the political background and the 
contemporary debate in Congress. I then explain how the new regime functioned. I argue 
that some of the trends attributed to the 1965 Act, in fact predated it, and that, to a 
considerable extent, they were due to other policy initiatives. These interacted with the 
Act’s provisions to change the scale and structure of immigration in a way that its original 
architects had not envisaged. I then explore the key mechanism involved, the so-called 
immigration multiplier.  Econometric estimates show that the effect of the existing 
migrant stock on the subsequent flow of immigrants is substantially larger the poorer is 
the source country. These findings are drawn together in the concluding section.  
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act. 
The Acts of 1952 and 1965 
In order to appreciate what the 1965 Act did it is necessary first to compare it with the pre-
existing legislation--the McCarran Walter Act (effective December 24, 1952). The 1952 Act 
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 An often recurring phrase in the literature relating to effects of the 1965 Act is “unintended consequences” 
(Lee, 1998, p. 49; Smith and Edmonston, 1997, p. 28; Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 176; Reimers, 1983 (in the title); 
Briggs 2003, p.133).  
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had reaffirmed the national origins quota system introduced in the Johnson-Reed Act of 
1924, which itself replaced the emergency quota of 1921. As in the 1924 Act, country quotas 
were set, based on the ancestry of the American population in 1920. Under the 1952 Act 
81.6 percent of the total numerical quota was assigned to Western European countries, 
principally the UK (43.2%) Germany (16.7%) and Ireland (11.5%), with 16 percent allocated 
to countries in Southern and Eastern Europe. Unused quota could not be transferred from 
one source-country to another. The Act also introduced a system of preferences, one for 
employment-based immigrants and three for relatives (Table 2) while, as previously, 
spouses and children of US citizens were admitted outside the quota. Perhaps most 
important, the McCarran-Walter Act eased the pre-existing legislation by introducing a small 
quota for immigration from the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle (2000 in total) and by allowing 
Asians already in the United States to naturalize. As in the pre-existing legislation no limit 
was placed on immigrants with roots in the Western Hemisphere and the Act changed to 
non-quota status immigrants from source countries in Central and South America that had 
become independent. On the other hand it restricted immigration from Caribbean colonies 
by removing the provision that these immigrants could be charged against the quota of the 
governing country (notably the UK). 
The 1965 Hart-Celler Act (effective 1st July 1968) represented a distinct break with the past.4 
The most important change was the abolition of the country quotas based on the national 
origins formula. Instead there was an overall limit of 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere 
with a cap of 20,000 for those born in any individual country and its colonies. The Asia 
Pacific triangle was scrapped and the countries that comprised it were included under the 
Eastern Hemisphere quota. And, since it was now a hemispheric pool, the transfer of 
unused quota was no longer an issue.5   The preference system was reorganised under eight 
preferences, as compared with the previous five (Table 2). Four of these were classes of 
non-immediate relatives, two were based on skill or occupation, and one brought refugees 
formally into the preferences system. As in earlier legislation, immediate relatives (spouses 
and children) were exempt from the numerical limit, although this was now extended to 
include the parents of US citizens. A major change was the introduction of an overall quota 
of 120,000 for the Western Hemisphere, which had not previously been subject to a quota, 
but without an individual country cap.6  No system of preferences was applied to the 
Western Hemisphere until 1976, and the two hemispheres were merged into a worldwide 
numerical limit of 290,000 in 1978.  
Politics and interest groups 
                                                          
4
 Even though, strictly speaking it was a set of amendments to the 1952 Act.  
5
 Between December 1965 and July 1
st
 1968 when the Act came into force, arrangements were made for the 
transfer of unused country quotas to an immigration pool up to the limit of 170,000.  
6
 The Act set up a Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration to recommend a framework for 
Western Hemisphere immigration. In the absence of recommendations to the contrary, the cap took effect in 
1968.  
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There are a number of reasons for the shift in immigration policy between 1952 and 1965. 
Clearly the political climate had changed in the intervening years. But it was not simply due 
to the change of the party in power. While Presidents Kennedy and Johnson supported 
reform of the quota system, so did their predecessors, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. 
Indeed the 1952 Act had been passed on an override of President Truman’s veto.7 Neither 
was it due simply to the Democrats’ enhanced strength in Congress following their 
overwhelming victory in the 1964 election, although that undoubtedly helped.8 The 1965 
Act received overwhelming support from both parties in both houses whereas a majority of 
both parties had voted for the override in 1952. However, there were important changes in 
the influential committee members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
(Tichenor, 2002, Ch7, Stern, 1975, pp. 67-71, ). In the Senate, the subcommittee that 
considered the 1965 Bill was chaired by Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and it included Hiram 
Fong (R-HI), the first Asian-American elected to the Senate. In the House, the subcommittee 
was chaired by Michael Feighan (D-OH), who replaced Francis Walter (D-PA), one of the 
architects of the 1952 Act and a lifelong restrictionist, who died in 1963.  The Chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee in 1965 was Emanuel Celler (D-NY), who had voted against the 
override in 1952.  
The wider political environment changed radically between 1952 and 1965. In 1952 the vote 
for the McCarran-Walter Act took place against the background of McCarthyism and a 
widespread distrust of foreigners. Indeed, McCarran (D-NV) sponsored the Internal Security 
Act and, as chairman Senate Judiciary Committee, created the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee that investigated subversion in the Federal Government. Francis Walter, also 
a staunch anti-communist, had previously chaired the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities. Thus the McCarran-Walter Act (Section 212 (a)) included a long list of exclusions 
for communists and others who were thought to be prejudicial to the national interest. By 
contrast, the background to the 1965 Act was the movement that led to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, even though the Cold War was still at its height. Both the civil rights reforms and 
immigration reforms were proposed by President Kennedy and were seen by many as 
encompassing the same principle of non-discrimination (Briggs, 1998, p. 122).9 
Kennedy’s original bill, introduced in 1963, proposed that national origins quotas would be 
abolished (including the restrictions on the Asia-Pacific Triangle) and replaced by a system of 
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 Each of these presidents proposed or supported radical reforms: Truman in 1952, Eisenhower in 1956 and 
1960, Kennedy in 1963, and Johnson in 1964. Interestingly, Johnson voted for the override in 1952.  
8
 One particular way in which it helped was that, with a Democrat majority in the House of 295 to only 140 
Republicans, the eastern and northern Democrats did not have to depend on their colleagues from the south. 
Although a majority of southern Democrats voted against the bill in August 1965, of the 48 Democrats who 
replaced Republicans in the 1964 election 47 voted in favor (Stern, 1975, pp. 56, 58, 128).  
9
 In the years since the 1952 Act there had been many attempts to reform or amend the national origins 
system but none had been successful. The proposals included pooling unused quota and altering the base year 
for the national origins formula.  In 1962 a bill sponsored by Philip Hart (D-MI), who subsequently introduced 
the 1963 Administration Bill in the Senate, proposed a formula based on the pattern of immigration in the last 
15 years adjusted by the population of source countries. 
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preferences, with a cap of 10 percent for any single country. Under this system, the first 
preference, up to 50 percent of the quota, would be allocated to highly skilled or trained 
workers, with subsequent preferences for occupations in demand, non-immediate relatives, 
and refugees.10 Although the Administration Bill did not reach the floor of the House or the 
Senate, essentially the same proposals were put forward after Kennedy’s death by President 
Johnson. But what emerged after the committee stages was rather different. The balance of 
preferences was shifted towards family reunification and away from employment and skills. 
In the 1965 Act the occupation-based preferences were third and sixth, each up to a 
maximum of ten percent of the overall Eastern Hemisphere total, with the first, second, 
fourth and fifth preferences allocated to family reunification. As Table 2 illustrates, the 
employment based preferences were demoted in the order and their share reduced from 50 
to 20 percent. In addition it required that admission under the third, sixth and non-
preference category, as well as non-immediate relatives from the Western Hemisphere, 
required certification from the Secretary of Labor that there were not sufficient able and 
qualified workers available and that it would not adversely affect wages. 
The modifications to the original Administration Bill were seen as necessary to gain majority 
support in both houses. When defending the Bill before the House, Emanuel Celler argued a 
number of key points: 
The thrust of this bill is no appreciable increase in numbers. . . . With the end of 
discrimination due to place of birth, there will be shifts to countries other than those of 
northern and western Europe. Immigrants from Asia and Africa will have to compete 
and qualify in order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself will hold the 
numbers down. There will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this 
country. . . .since the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, 
comparatively few could immigrate from those countries because they have no family 
ties in the United States. . .. no one can come without the individual certificate from the 
Secretary of Labor guaranteeing that the American workman will not be displaced. . . . 
few of them can even pay the cost of the ticket to come here. There is no danger 
whatsoever of an influx from the countries of Africa and Asia (Congressional Record, 
Aug. 25, 1965, p. 21757-8).  
Thus there were two main reasons for thinking that the pattern of immigration would 
change only slowly. The first was the notion that relatively few potential immigrants from 
the poorer parts of the world would qualify under the employment preferences. The 
second was that the weight given to family preferences would ensure that the existing 
pattern of migration would be replicated through chain migration.  The first of these was 
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 The Bill, H.R. 7700, provided for the abolition of national origins to be phased in over five years and it 
proposed to extend non-quota status to Western Hemisphere countries becoming independent since the 
McCarran-Walter Act. It would also have given authority to the president to reserve a large part of the pool for 
country-specific ‘national security provision’ and for refugees. The same proposals were published 
posthumously in the revised edition of John F. Kennedy’s book A Nation of Immigrants (1964, Appendix D, pp. 
102-7).  
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used to garner support from organised labor, particularly the AFL-CIO, which came out in 
support of the Act (Stern, 1975, pp. 107-110, 186-191; Tichenor, 2002, pp. 203-11). Under 
the McCarran Walter Act, the burden of proof lay with Secretary of Labor to show cause to 
deny entry. Now the burden of proof lay with applicants, and often also their prospective 
employers, to show no adverse consequences. Effectively this meant that an applicant 
either had to be qualified in one of a selective list of occupations, or required a job offer 
prior to admission. This was seen as a much tougher labor test and one that would most 
affect prospective immigrants from the Western Hemisphere (Schwartz, 1966, pp. 99-102; 
Keely 1971, p. 160). 
Perhaps more important was the stress on family reunification. Tight restrictions against 
Asian immigrants had been in place since the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and there were 
concerns in some quarters about a steep rise in Asian immigration. Responding to these, 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy informed the House Immigration Subcommittee that 
immigration from the Asia-pacific Triangle would be about 5000 in the first year and 
would subsequently decline (U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee No 1, 1964 Hearings, p. 418.). While some observers have warned against 
taking such comments at face value (Chin, 1996), others in authority took a similar, if less 
extreme, view. Thus Senator Hiram Fong argued that the base population of Asian origin 
was so small that people with Asian roots could never amount to more than 1 percent of 
the population (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 1965, pp.71, 119.). The same point 
was put by the Japanese-American Citizens’ League (Briggs 1984, p. 69), but their 
arguments for a ‘fairer’ policy came to nothing. In large part this is because there was 
powerful support for the notion that, through the same mechanism, the policy would 
favor mainly southern and eastern Europeans.11 These had been a large share of 
immigration in the two decades before 1914, but had received only small quotas under 
the national origins system. Nevertheless, in 1960 they still constituted 40 percent of the 
migrant stock and therefore stood to benefit significantly from a policy based on family 
reunification.  
In fact most of the debate in Congress was about immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere. The original bill placed no ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigrants. But 
concerns about cheap labour from across the Mexican border led in 1964 to the termination 
of the Bracero program, which had, since the early 1940s, brought in temporary workers for 
seasonal employment on southern farms.12 Some lobbyists sought to restrict what they 
                                                          
11
 Some of the key legislators, such as Feighan, represented districts that were dominated by immigrants from 
southern and Eastern Europe. These included House sub-committee members Harold Donahue (D-MA), Jacob 
Gilbert (D-NY) and Peter Rodino (D-NJ) (Stern 1975, pp. 40, 69-70).  
12
 Some 4.5 million workers came under the Bracero Program between 1942 and 1964, 93 percent of whom 
were Mexicans. Reaction against illegal Mexicans resulted in Operation Wetback which was mounted in 1954, 
removing over a million in that year.     
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thought might be a surge of immigrants from the south by imposing an overall cap on 
Western Hemisphere immigration. This was proposed in the House by Clark MacGregor (R-
MN) and was defeated by a narrow margin.  It was reintroduced in the Senate and became 
part of the final bill, such that in the absence of further amendments it was imposed in 
1968.  As noted earlier a system of preferences was introduced for the Western Hemisphere 
in 1976 and the two Hemispheres were merged in 1978. With the exception of specific 
measures for refugees in 1980, and illegal immigrants in 1986, this basic structure remained 
in place until it was superseded by the 1990 Immigration Act (effective 1992).  
The changing pattern of immigration 
Trends in immigration 
In assessing the effects of the Hart-Celler Act it is useful to begin with a longer term 
perspective. As Table 1 illustrates, the pattern of immigration was changing even before the 
1965 Act came into force in mid-1968. Clearly it cannot have been initiated by the Hart-
Celler Act. In the 1950s the total volume of immigration rose sharply from the levels of the 
1930s and 1940s. From the 1950s to the 1960s there was a sharp rise in Asian immigration; 
starting from a small base in 1951 the number increased by a factor of six by 1965. This was 
partly due to the modest quota that replaced the total ban on immigration from the Asia 
Pacific Triangle. And it was fuelled by the fact that Asians could now become citizens and 
therefore bring in close relatives as non-quota immigrants. There is also a notable increase 
across these decades in immigration from the Caribbean (mainly Cubans) and from South 
America--at a time when there was no cap on Western Hemisphere immigration.  
Figure 1 shows the persistent upward trend in the annual number of immigrants admitted 
during the life of the McCarran-Walter and Hart-Celler Acts, from less than 200,000 to more 
than 600,000 per annum. During the period from 1952 to 1965, when unused quota could 
not be transferred, the number admitted under the quota was only about two thirds of the 
numerical limit (154,657). In the transitional period, from 1965 until 1968, when unused 
quota was made transferable, the numbers rose and then jumped to the new quota level in 
1968. Non-quota immigration gradually increased under the McCarran Walter Act, such that 
between 1953 and 1965 only 35 percent of immigrants were admitted under the quota. In 
1968 non-quota immigration fell sharply as the numerical limit was expanded to include the 
Western Hemisphere. From 1969 numerically exempt immigration again increased, with a 
jump when the worldwide limit was introduced, and by the early 1980s it exceeded quota 
immigration. One implication stemming from Figure 1 (and Table 1) is that the trends in the 
volume and composition of immigration are due in large measure to the growth in the 
number of immigrants admitted outside of the numerical limit.   
One important feature, reflected in Table 1, is the treatment of Western Hemisphere 
immigrants. The number of Mexicans increased sharply in the 1950s, from around 7,000 per 
year before 1952 to 40,000 in 1965. These figures exclude Braceros who were temporary 
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workers, although there was some spillover from the Bracero Program to permanent 
residency. And although there was no cap on the Western Hemisphere, visas were 
restricted by US consular offices in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America on the grounds 
that prospective immigrants would not qualify for labor certification or because of the 
likelihood that they would become a public charge (Schwartz 1966, pp. 102-3; North and 
Houstoun, 1979, p. 37). The new law seems to have operated differently and, in the absence 
of the Bracero Program, Mexicans and also other Latin Americans increasingly gained 
admission. One method was first to work illegally and then to acquire the support of an 
employer in order to apply for certification, which was required for low skilled labor.13  But a 
larger share came through family reunification, which had previously been restricted only to 
immediate family members. 
Refugees 
An important but sometimes neglected stream of immigration in the first three post-war 
decades is refugees. Under the McCarran-Walter Act there was no formal refugee stream 
but refugees were admitted under a clause that gave the Attorney General parole authority 
to admit refugees.14 Some were admitted under special legislation, largely for displaced 
persons and Cold War refugees. As Table 2 shows, in the 1950s and 1960s the overwhelming 
majority came from Europe—mainly the residue of World War II displacements, followed by 
a stream Soviet dissidents and refugees from the Hungarian uprising.  But from the early 
1960s the balance changed, first towards the Caribbean with the Cuban exiles, and then in 
the 1970s with a surge of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.15  This was one 
important element in the shifting source country composition. And it was compounded by 
the fact that these new refugees could more readily unite with their relatives than could 
escapees from behind the Iron Curtain.  
By providing a specific preference for refugees in the 1965 Act, Congress had sought to limit 
the power of the executive to admit refugees. But such hopes were quickly dashed. On the 
same day that the Hart-Celler Act passed into law (3rd October) President Johnson also 
signed the Refugee Conditional Entrants Act, under which 140,000 refugees were admitted 
in the years up to 1980. Indeed, it was the continuing practice of ad hoc refugee admissions 
outside of the numerical limit that led to the 1980 Refugee Act (Kennedy 1981; Anker and 
                                                          
13 A letter from the prospective employer was required stating that there were no Americans who were “able, 
willing, qualified, and available” and that the normal wage for the job would be paid. Mexicans often entered 
with non-immigrant visas, with a border crossing card (I-186), or without inspection, and then worked illegally. 
The illegal immigrant then applied with the employer’s support for labor certification, returning home once 
the visa arrived in order to re-enter as a permanent resident (North and Houstoun, 1979, pp. 43-5).  
14
 This was under section 212 (d) (5) of the McCarran-Walter Act. Those admitted by parole authority did not 
initially gain permanent residency but most were subsequently adjusted. Refugee policy, and particularly the 
use of parole, is described in detail by Anker and Posner (1981-2).  
15
 Kraly (1990, pp. 86-9) gives a detailed analysis of refugees granted permanent resident status by period and 
country of origin. 
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Posner 1981-2).16 This introduced a separate refugee stream (initially of 50,000 places), 
eliminating the 7th preference, and reducing the numerical limit to 270,000. Ironically, 
within a matter of weeks the Cuban exodus erupted and parole authority was invoked once 
again to cope with those fleeing in what became known as the Mariel Boatlift.17 Exceptions 
continued to be made but, more importantly, year-by-year allocations were made far in 
excess of 50,000, so that in the two decades from 1980 nearly 1.7 million refugees were 
admitted under the 1980 Act.  
Apart from refugees, a number of other special exemptions were made—both before and 
after the 1965 Act came into force. Although the numbers were relatively small compared 
with refugees, they included administrative waivers of exclusion, adjustments of a status 
and suspensions of deportation as well as specific programs for orphans and disaster victims 
(Bennett, 1966;   ). 
 
Immigration by class of admission 
The composition of entry routes by source region is illustrated in the upper panel of Table 4 
for fiscal year 1982. Three features stand out. The first is that two thirds of all immigrants 
were admitted either through the family preferences or as immediate relatives. For 
immigrants from North and South America the share was more than ninety percent. Second, 
other admissions, made up mainly of refugees, account for more than a quarter of the total. 
For Asians the share exceeded 40 percent and it was the single largest contributor to the 
rapid growth of the immigrant population. For Asians and for those from some parts of 
Europe, this was important to establishing the base for further immigration through family 
reunification. Third, because more than half of all immigrants were admitted outside the 
quota, employment-based admissions account for less than five percent of the total. It is 
worth noting that this category includes accompanying relatives as well as the principals. As 
a result, just two thirds of the 4.4 percent were immigrants admitted directly on the basis of 
employment. 
The lower panel of Table 4 shows that, of all immigrants aged 16 and over, 5.4 percent were 
admitted with labor certification. Clearly, the certification did not screen out immigrants 
from Asia and Latin America, as had been expected in 1965, although the rates were lower 
than for immigrants from Europe. However, more than two-fifths of adults declared an 
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 In 1968 the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention of 1951 (thereby 
invoking the terms of the Convention) but this was not formally incorporated into law until the 1980 Act. The 
terms of the Convention include the definition of a refugee (Article 1) as someone with a ‘well founded fear of 
persecution …’ (rather than just those fleeing communism) and the so-called non-refoulement clause (Article 
33) prohibiting that a person be returned to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened.  
17
 In April 1980, after a group of dissidents gate-crashed the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, Fidel Castro 
announced that any Cubans who wanted to leave could depart through the port of Mariel. Between then and 
October 1980, approximately 125,000 Cubans sailed for the United States, most of whom settled in Miami.  
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occupation and these were listed according to a standard occupational classification.18 
These occupations have been divided into two broad categories. The skilled group includes 
professional technical and managerial as well as clerical and skilled blue collar workers, and 
the unskilled group is mainly labourers, farm-hands and domestic workers. Of all those 
reporting an occupation 57 percent were skilled, as compared with 65 percent in the last 
years of the McCarran-Walter Act (Mott, 1966, p. 25). The labor certification system was 
heavily criticised for being administratively cumbersome and not particularly skill-selective, 
especially in relation to labor migrants from the Western Hemisphere.19 Table 4 shows that, 
on this classification, 86 percent of those with labor certification were skilled. The last row 
of the table shows that, among those declaring an occupation, but without certification, the 
share of skilled was much lower at 54 percent. Thus the labor certification program was 
somewhat skill selective, and it is possible that rapidly improving skills and education 
allowed immigrants from the poorer parts of the world to take advantage of this route.  
The inflow also included an unknown number of illegal immigrants. It is estimated that the 
stock of undocumented stood at around three million in 1980 most of whom had arrived 
during the previous decade 1960s. Nearly four fifths were from North and South America, 
with more than half from Mexico alone (Warren and Passel, 1987, p. 380).  While adding to 
the total number of arrivals these do not appear in the statistics for legal immigration 
except insofar as initially undocumented immigrants were able to find a way to become 
legalised. The total rose strongly in the 1980s and then declined as 2.7 million were legalised 
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 (Passel, 2007). Those who 
were legalised qualified for family reunification, which added to the volume of visa 
applications during the 1990s (Woodrow-Lafield, 1994).  
The power of chain migration 
The immigration multiplier 
Chain migration is widely seen as a powerful force that magnifies the effects of original 
arrivals leading to strong persistence in immigration streams from specific source countries 
and localities.  To many observers the Hart-Celler Act, with its emphasis on family 
preferences and with immediate family members exempt from numerical limitation, firmly 
enshrined chain migration as the principal entry channel. As we have seen, some observers 
thought that this, together with strict labor certification, would ensure that the source 
country composition of immigration would change only slowly. Yet shifts in the composition 
occurred more rapidly than most would have expected. Here I examine the strength of the 
relationship between the stock of immigrants and the subsequent flow in the decades 
following the 1965 Act. 
                                                          
18
 This was the intended occupation for those with certification and the previous occupation for those without. 
19
 The legal issues involved are discussed by Rubin and Mancini (1976-7) and Steele (1981-2).  
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A number of studies have examined the ‘immigration multiplier’ for this period. Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1986, 1989, 1990) used microdata from the early 1970s to calculate 
sponsorship rates through the different immigration channels, which could then be 
aggregated to produce immigration multipliers. They concluded that, on average, one 
original male entering as a labor certified immigrant would produce 0.9 additional 
immigrants over the following decade and a total of 1.2 additional migrants over three 
generations. Sponsorship rates for females were slightly higher, and for the spouses of labor 
certified immigrants substantially lower (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990, pp. 218-221). They 
also found that four fifths of those who sponsored spouses were native-born US citizens and 
thus were not linked to a previous immigrant. The top five countries for sponsored spouses 
were either contiguous with the US (Canada and Mexico) or locations of major military 
bases (Philippines, Germany and the UK). Thus for these reasons, the immigration multiplier 
as calculated through sponsorship rates does not seem to have been as strong as some 
would believe.  
More recently Yu (2008) calculated synthetic sponsorship rates from the different categories 
of admission for each year from 1972 to 1997 taking into account accompanying family as 
well as subsequent sponsorship. The average value of the multiplier over these years is 2.12 
when accompanying family are included and 1.59 when they are excluded. One feature of 
the results is that the value of the (total) multiplier increases over time, from 1.33 in 1972 to 
2.58 in 1997 (Yu, 2008, p. 190). This would be consistent with shifts in the composition of 
immigrants towards source countries with higher than average sponsorship rates. Yu also 
calculated differences between source regions in the average value of the multiplier for 
1972-97. The highest value is for immigrants from Asia  (2.79) followed by Latin America 
(2.25), the Middle East (2.03), Europe (1.40), Oceania/other (1.25), North America (1.14), 
and Africa (1.06) (Yu, 2008, p 192).  Other evidence also suggests that multipliers differ 
across different origin groups. Borjas and Bronars (1991) examined arrival cohorts of 
immigrants residing in the same household in 1980. Less than ten percent of European 
Immigrants arriving in 1970-4 had a subsequent arrival living with them while the rate for 
those born in the Korea, Mexico or the Philippines was more than 20 percent.    
Model and data 
There is a large literature on the effects of networks in international migration which paints 
a picture of cumulative causation through a variety of different mechanisms (Massey et al., 
1993; Carrington et al., 1996). A number of econometric studies also lend support to so-
called friends and relatives effect on the flow international migration (Yang, 1995, Ch. 5; 
Clark et al., 2007; Pedersen et al., 2008; Hatton and Williamson, 2011; Beine et al., 2011a,b). 
These studies estimate the effects of the migrant stock in the presence of other variables 
but they do not focus on specific entry channels. Here I explore the relationship between 
the stock of immigrants and the subsequent flow over the period that the Hart-Celler Act 
was in force. I investigate two questions. First, how does the effect of the migrant stock 
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depend on source country conditions, specifically the level of income per capita? And 
second, how does the strength of this effect vary across different classes of admission?   
The model to be estimated is as follows: 
      
    
      
    
    
          
    
    
                      
Where, Mi,t+1 is the flow of immigrants from country i between time t and t+1, Si,t is the 
stock of foreign-born from country i at the beginning of the period and Pi,t is the source 
country population. Xi,t is per capita income in the source country and this also appears as 
an interaction with the migrant stock. If the migrant stock effect is stronger for poor source 
countries then α4 will be negative. That would also imply that the effect of source country 
income is more negative the larger is the migrant stock. This is consistent with the idea that 
the larger is the existing network, the less income constrained are potential immigrants 
from poor countries. Zi,t is a vector of other source country variables that influence the 
decision to migrate and ui is a country fixed effect, which absorbs all time invariant effects, 
such as distance, language and culture.  Finally, conditions in the United States are absorbed 
by the period fixed effects, dt. 
The data for immigration by country of birth come from the data files of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. They are for those gaining permanent residency and they 
exclude temporary admissions and legalisations.  These data are available from fiscal year 
1972, and to match with other variables in the dataset they are aggregated into five year 
totals for each of 102 countries.  The immigrant stock comes from birthplaces as recorded in 
the US census and is interpolated between censuses using the immigrant flow. The timing is 
such that, for example, the total immigrant inflow for fiscal years 1972-6 is related to the 
stock in 1970, and the flow for 1977-81 is related to the stock in 1975. It is important to 
recognise that the sponsorship lag could be quite long. The waiting time between 
permanent residency and citizenship (required for sponsorship under preferences 1, 4 and 
5) was five years. And while the evidence suggests that sponsorship typically took place 
within a few years of gaining citizenship, there could be a further wait because of backlogs 
in the preference system.20   However, the total immigrant stock consists of those who had 
migrated at any time in the past and so alternative measures of the stock are constructed 
for those who arrived within the last ten years and those who arrived within the last 20 
years.21 Details of the construction of immigrant stock and flow variables are discussed in 
the data appendix.  
                                                          
20
 During the1970s and 1980s the median length of residence before naturalization was around eight years, 
which includes the five year waiting period. For immigrant from Asia and Africa it was 6-7 years (Statistical 
Yearbook, 1987, p.  xxxvii) 
21
 Where the immigrant stock is defined over the previous ten years the average lag between the arrival of a 
member of the stock and the arrival of a member of the subsequent flow is about nine years. For example, the 
approximate average year of arrival for a member of the ten-year immigrant stock in 1970 would be 1965 and 
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The other explanatory variables are country income, education and demography. GDP per 
capita is taken from the Penn World Tables version 6.3. The share of the source country 
population aged 20-34 with some tertiary education is taken from Barro and Lee (2012). 
This variable provides a test of the hypothesis that the growth in source country education 
levels helped to boost immigration. Also included is the total fertility rate a decade earlier, 
taken from the World Bank. This is an indirect measure of family size—a factor that might 
be expected to influence the potential number of family reunification migrants.  
Table 5 provides regressions for five-year immigration inflows with fixed source country 
effects and period dummies.  The first column uses the total immigrant stock and its 
interaction with GDP per capita. While the main effect of the immigrant stock is positive the 
interaction with GDP is strongly negative. Thus, as expected, the migrant stock effect is 
larger the poorer is the country. As GDP is measured in thousands of 2005 US dollars, the 
migrant stock effect for a country such as China, with a per capita income of $1000, is that 
every 100 of the stock adds (0.401 -0.024(1))*100 = 37.7 further immigrants in the 
subsequent five year period. On the other hand for a country like the UK or France with a 
per capita GDP of $16,000, the migrant stock effect would be close to zero. Thus the effect 
of the existing migrant stock varies widely depending on source country income and living 
standards. Because of the interaction, the effect of source country GDP also varies. For a 
country with a (relatively small) migrant stock to source to population ratio of 2 per 
thousand the effect of income on immigration is positive (0.101 – 0.024(2)) = 0.053. Thus 
the migration rate is more constrained by low income where migrant networks are very 
sparse. According to this estimate, for countries with an existing migrant stock in the US of 
more than about four per thousand source country income has the conventional negative 
effect on immigration, and the larger the stock the more negative the income effect will be.  
The second and third columns use different measures of the immigrant stock.  In each case 
the main immigrant stock effect is positive and the interaction effect is negative. Not 
surprisingly, the coefficients become larger in magnitude as the definition of the migrant 
stock is narrowed. An increase of 100 in the ten year migrant stock leads to a flow over five 
years of 68 from a source country with income of $1000 but only 7 from one with an income 
of $16,000. By contrast with income and the migrant stock, the other variables in the table 
have insignificant coefficients. The effect of tertiary education in the source country is close 
to zero. This is consistent with an immigration policy which did not, in the event, select 
positively for education. This could also reflect the poverty constraint such that positive 
selection would be stronger at lower income levels. But when an interaction between the 
share tertiary educated and GDP added to column 1 is insignificant (‘t = 0.45). The lagged 
fertility rate, while always positive, is not significant suggesting that demographic effects are 
relatively weak. Finally the dummy for the Western Hemisphere in the earlier years is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the average year of arrival for the subsequent flow would be 1974. While some members of the stock would 
be too recent to be US citizens they could still sponsor immediate relatives through the second preference, 
requiring only permanent resident status.  
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positive. This suggests that Western Hemisphere immigrants were crowded out by Eastern 
Hemisphere immigrants in the competition for numerically limited visas after the 
hemispheric quotas were merged into the worldwide numerical limit in 1978.22  
Before moving to a more disaggregated analysis it is worth considering possible bias in the 
coefficients.  Given that the explanatory variables all occur in advance of the outcome 
reverse causality should not be a problem. And heterogeneity across countries is eliminated 
by the use of fixed country effects. Nevertheless, endogeneity between the migrant stock 
and the subsequent flow could arise as the result of measurement error (due to 
undocumented immigrants) or because of some persistence in unobserved source country 
shocks. In the instrumental variables regressions of Table 6 the migrant stock and its 
interaction with GDP per capita are both instrumented. The variables used as instruments 
are the migrant stocks in other rich country destinations from the same source country and 
for the same period. The destination countries are Australia, Canada, the UK, France, 
Germany and Sweden. The results in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5 except that the 
coefficients on the instrumented variables are larger in absolute magnitude. Thus, the 
results from instrumental variables do not suggest that the coefficients in Table 4 are biased 
upwards due to endogeneity. 
The total flow of immigration is the result of entry through different channels with different 
criteria for admission. We would therefore expect that to be reflected in differences in the 
coefficients across classes of admission. Accordingly, the five-year immigration rates have 
been disaggregated into four broad classes. The first is employment based immigrants—
essentially those admitted under preferences 3 and 6. The second is non-immediate family 
members admitted under preferences 1, 2 and 5. The third group is immediate relatives 
who were admitted outside of the overall quota. Finally the fourth category, all other 
immigrants, includes those admitted under preferences 7 and 8 and those admitted outside 
the numerical limit but excluding immediate family members. These are largely refugees 
and others who were given special dispensation.  
The results are presented in Table 7, where the migrant stock variable used is for those who 
had been in the US for ten years or less.  The first column shows that for the relatively small 
employment stream none of the explanatory variables have a significant effect. In particular 
there is no evidence of chain migration effects, which is a little surprising in the light of the 
literature on transnational employment networks. And it is notable that the coefficient on 
the share with tertiary education remains small and relatively insignificant. Thus, even 
through the employment stream, there is little evidence that immigration was driven by 
source country education. The second column, for the non-immediate relative preferences 
gives a large positive coefficient on the immigrant stock and a negative coefficient on the 
interaction with GDP which is only marginally significant. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
                                                          
22
 This effect seems to have dominated the increase in admission routes that became available when the 
preference system was applied to the Western Hemisphere in 1976.   
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coefficients more strongly resembles that for total migration. Here also the Western 
Hemisphere dummy is large and positive, reflecting the fact that in the absence of 
preferences for the Western Hemisphere before 1978 all numerically limited immigrants are 
treated as family based.  
Not surprisingly, the third regression, for immediate relatives, also resembles the results for 
total immigration, this time with strongly significant coefficients on the migrant stock and its 
interaction with GDP per capita. Finally the heterogeneous group in the last column 
produces the somewhat anomalous result of a negative coefficient on the interaction term, 
which may simply reflect the fact that these are mainly refugees. Overall the results are 
consistent with the idea that the relationship between the stock of immigrants and the 
subsequent flow does indeed work through the family reunification channels. 
Cumulative effects  
The results obtained here use a completely different method to the studies based on 
calculating sponsorship rates.  However some comparison can be made by taking a one 
period increase in the immigrant stock and allowing its effects to cumulate across periods. 
The results for unweighted averages of countries using the regression coefficients in the 
third column of Table 5 are presented in the upper panel of Table 8. On average the number 
of additional immigrants from an initial shock of 100 immigrants is 32.5 after ten years and 
34.7 after twenty years. These immigration multipliers are more modest than those 
estimated from sponsorship rates, partly because of the different method but also because 
the base for the initial immigration shock is all immigrants and not just principals.23 More 
important, although the average multiplier effects are far from explosive, they vary widely 
between source regions with different average income levels. For Europe only 15 additional 
immigrants are generated over 20 years while for Asia, the Americas and Africa/Oceania the 
comparable figures are 65.4, 75.8 and 89.6.  
While the upper panel of Table 8 shows the effect of a rise in the migrant stock by 100 for 
one period only, the lower panel shows the effect of a sustained shock to the immigrant 
stock. In this case each 5-year period’s immigration adds to the 10-year immigration stock 
for two periods, which in turn creates further immigration.  This is intended to capture the 
effect of an underlying shift in the immigration rate, independent of the friends and 
relatives effect. On average this leads to a doubling of the inflow after 20 years. For Europe 
the increase is modest, just an increase to 143 from a base of 100. But for immigration from 
Asia the figure is 269 and for the Americas it is 293.  Thus although the immigration 
multiplier as conventionally defined is relatively modest, if the immigration shock is 
persistent, then once an immigration flow becomes established the numbers cumulate quite 
rapidly.  
                                                          
23
 Yu (2008. p. 190) estimated that principal immigrants were accompanied by an average of 0.15 spouses and 
0.38 children. These principals would then bring a further 1.59 immigrants. But if the accompanying family 
members are included in the base then the multiplier falls to 1.59/(1 + 0.15+0.38) = 1.03.   
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Conclusion 
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act are often seen as a watershed in immigration 
policy, which transformed the face of US immigration in the decades that followed. While 
contemporary legislators anticipated some of these effects, the changes in the scale and 
structure of immigration, and the speed with which they took place, were not foreseen. 
Against the background of the national origins system that had been in place for more than 
a generation, past experience offered little basis upon which to predict. Looking back, 
historians have largely concurred with the view that the consequences were largely 
unintended. This paper sheds further light on exactly what caused such a dramatic increase 
in immigration and such a radical shift in immigrant origins during the two decades that the 
Hart-Celler Act was in force. In fact several different components contributed and they 
interacted to produce unexpected results.  
Some of the ingredients are obvious, others less so. The most obvious is the key provision of 
the Hart-Celler Act, the abolition of the national origins system. The full utilisation of the 
numerical quota and the associated increases in immediate relatives were direct and 
deliberate results of the reform. Yet even before this, the volume of immigration had been 
steadily increasing, partly due to the modest liberalisation of the McCarran Walter Act, but 
mainly because of the continuing admission of refugees outside the mainstream 
immigration system.  Although the Hart-Celler Act attempted to cap refugee numbers, the 
continued use of parole authority and the shift in refugee origins provided a foundation for 
further inflows from countries and regions with little previous immigration history. And 
while the 1965 Act placed a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration, the abolition of 
the Bracero Program and the shift from restrictive informal procedures to more formal 
processes of labor certification expanded the scope for permanent immigration from Latin 
America.   
Those who framed the legislation of 1965 stressed two important features, neither of which 
operated in the way that was anticipated, and these are reflected in the empirical results 
presented above. The first was the shift in the burden of responsibility for labor 
certification, which it was thought, would restrict access through the employment 
preferences for potential immigrants from developing countries. Growing education could 
have helped, but source country education seems to have had little effect on access via 
employment. The second was the weight given to family preferences, which it was thought 
would largely preserve the pre-existing source country mix. The clear evidence is that the 
immigration multiplier, operating through the family preferences and through uncapped 
immediate relatives, was much larger for poorer source countries. As a result, the preceding 
experience with European immigration would have been a poor predictor of what was to 
follow.  
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Data Appendix 
Immigration to the United States: The US Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service publishes various tabulations of immigrants in its Statistical Yearbooks, and before 1978, in 
its Annual Report. The microdata underlying these reports, is available as a series of files (one for 
each year) under the title “Immigrants Admitted to the United States”, which together with the 
codebooks, was supplied by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. These 
data were used to construct the number of immigrants by country of birth and by different routes of 
entry for each of the fiscal years from 1972 to 1991.  Fiscal year 1972 is 1st July 1971 to 30th June 
1972, but from 1977 the fiscal year changed from 1st October to 30th September.  The third quarter 
of 1976 (for which there is a separate file) has been omitted from the calculations. These data record 
all admissions to permanent residency, including both new arrivals and adjustments of status, but 
excluding visitors and temporary migrants.   
US Immigrant Stock: Stock by country of birth for each census year is taken from: Gibson, C. and 
Jung, K. (2006), “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 
1850-2000,” Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper No. 81. The years ending in ‘5’ are 
interpolated between the census benchmarks using the relationship: Si, t+1 = Mi, t+1 + dSi,,t where Si, t  is 
the immigrant stock, born in country i observed in year t, Mt is the flow during the subsequent year,  
and d is a ‘depreciation rate’, which reflects deaths and return migration. This depreciation rate is 
calculated for each country/decade using an iterative procedure beginning with Si,t, such that the 
value of Si, t+10 obtained by cumulating forward is reconciled with that of the next census benchmark. 
The immigrant stock present for 10 and 20 years are obtained by applying the shares of those 
present for different durations to the total stock. The ratios are calculated for each country/census 
year using the IPUMS census samples from:  http://usa.ipums.org/usa/.  
GDP per capita and Population:  Constant price ($US, 2005) GDP per capita and Population from Alan 
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2009), “Penn World Table Version 6.3,” Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, at 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php.   
Educational attainment:  For those aged 20-35 at five year intervals taken from Barro and Lee at: 
http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm,. See  Barro ,R. and Lee, J. W. (2010), “A New Data Set 
of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010” NBER Working Paper No. 15902. Missing 
countries are represented by the average for countries in the same region.  
Total Fertility Rate: From the World Bank Databank at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&hActiveDimensionId=WDI_Series.  
Other migrant stock: Migrant stock in Australia, Canada, UK France, Germany and Sweden by source 
country from World Bank Global Bilateral Database at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database. The years ending in ‘5’ are linearly interpolated 
between the ten-year benchmarks.  Refugee stock by country of origin is from United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html.  
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The countries that are used in the empirical work are all those for which the explanatory variables 
could be found or constructed.  They are as follows: 
Europe Asia Africa North America 
Albania Afghanistan Algeria Canada 
Austria Bangladesh Cameroon Mexico 
Belgium Cambodia  Congo, D.  R. (Zaire) Barbados 
Bulgaria China  Egypt Cuba 
Czechoslovakia Cyprus Ghana Dominican Republic 
Denmark Hong Kong Kenya Haiti 
Finland India Liberia Jamaica 
France Indonesia Libya Trinidad & Tobago 
Germany Iran Morocco Belize 
Greece Iraq Senegal Costa Rica 
Hungary Israel Sierra Leone El Salvador 
Iceland Japan South Africa Guatemala 
Ireland Jordan Sudan Honduras 
Italy Korea Tanzania Nicaragua 
Luxembourg Kuwait Tunisia Panama 
Malta Laos Uganda South America 
Netherlands Malaysia Zambia Argentina 
Norway Nepal Zimbabwe Bolivia 
Poland Pakistan Oceania Brazil 
Portugal Philippines Australia Chile 
Romania Saudi Arabia Fiji Colombia 
Soviet Union Singapore New Zealand Ecuador 
Spain Sri Lanka Tonga Guyana 
Sweden Syria  Paraguay 
Switzerland Thailand  Peru 
United Kingdom Turkey  Uruguay 
Yugoslavia  Vietnam  Venezuela 
 
23 
 
Table 1: Source Region Composition of US immigration 1920-2009 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 2010 Table 2. Note: based on country of last residence; East Asia does not include Vietnam.  
  1920 to 
1929  
 1930 to 
1939  
 1940 to 
1949  
 1950 to 
1959  
 1960 to 
1969  
 1970 to 
1979  
 1980 to 
1989  
 1990 to 
1999  
 2000 to 
2009  
 Europe          59.6          63.5      55.2       56.2        35.3       19.4       10.7      13.8      13.1  
            Ireland, Germany, UK  21.7    29.9  31.2  32.8  14.6  5.2  4.2  3.2         3.0  
            Other NW Europe  10.2           9.2  10.9         7.0            4.9  1.6        1.3  1.0             1.2  
            South Europe  15.9        14.7            8.0           10.0          12.0  9.4            2.5         1.5             0.7  
            East Europe 11.9      9.7       5.1        6.3            3.8    3.2      2.7  8.1        8.2  
 Asia     3.0       2.7      4.0     5.4    11.2       33.1     38.3     29.3     33.7  
            East Asia       2.8  5.1  12.0  12.3  8.6    10.1  
            Other Asia    2.7 6.0 21.1 26.0 20.7 23.6 
 America         37.0       32.9    38.3    36.9    52.1     44.8     43.2    52.6    43.1  
            Canada    22.1       23.3      18.8     14.1     13.5         4.2        2.5      2.0     2.3  
            Mexico     11.6      4.7     6.6   11.0   13.7     14.6   16.2   28.2   16.5  
            Caribbean       1.9    2.6  5.4       4.6     13.3     16.7      12.7    10.3   10.2  
            Central America     0.4       1.0      2.4  1.6      3.1  2.8   5.4   6.2   5.7  
            South America   1.0   1.4     2.3     3.1       7.8       6.4    6.4   5.8     8.3  
 Africa    0.1      0.3      0.8      0.5     0.7     1.7     2.3   3.5       7.4  
 Oceania           0.2             0.5            1.7    0.5     0.7    0.9     0.7     0.6    0.6  
 Not Specified             0.0            -            0.0         0.5      0.0             0.0             4.9             0.3             2.1  
 Total       100.0        100.0      100.0     100.0  100.0      100.0     100.0      100.0      100.0  
 Number (000s)       4,296            699           857        2,499      3,214       4,248      6,244       9,775     10,299  
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Table 2: Schedule of Eastern Hemisphere Preferences in 1952 and 1965 Immigration Acts 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952 Amendments to the Immigration Act, 1965 
(1) First preference: Highly skilled immigrants whose 
services are urgently needed in the U. S. and the spouse 
and children of such immigrants. 50% plus any not required 
for 2nd and 3rd preference. 
(1) First preference: Unmarried sons and daughters of U. S. 
citizens. Not more than 20%. 
(2) Second preference: Parents of U. S. citizens over the age 
of 21 and unmarried sons and daughters of U. S. citizens. 
30% plus any not required for 1st and 3rd preference. 
(2) Second preference: Spouse and unmarried sons and 
daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence. 20% plus any not required for first preference. 
(3) Third preference: Spouse and unmarried sons and 
daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence. 20% plus any not required for first or second 
preference. 
(3) Third preference: Members of the professions and 
scientists and artists of exceptional ability. Not more than 
10%. 
(4) Fourth preference: Brothers, sisters, married sons and 
daughters of U. S. citizens and an accompanying spouse and 
children. 50% of numbers not required for first three 
preferences. 
(4) Fourth preference: Married sons and daughters of U. S. 
citizens. 10% plus any not required for first three 
preferences. 
5) Nonpreference: Applicants not entitled to one of the 
above preferences. 50%o of numbers not required for first 
three preferences, plus any not required for fourth 
preference. 
(5) Fifth preference: Brothers and sisters of U. S. citizens. 
24% plus any not required for first four preferences. 
 (6) Sixth preference: Skilled and unskilled workers in 
occupations for which labor is in short supply in U. S. Not 
more than 10%. 
 (7) Seventh preference: Refugees to whom conditional 
entry or adjustment of status may be granted. Not more 
than 6%. 
 8) Nonpreference: Any applicant not entitled to one of the 
above preferences. Any numbers not required for 
preference applicants 
Source: Keely, 1971, p. 160.  
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Table 3: Refugees Granted Permanent Residence Status, 1946-2000 
 
 
 
Source: INS Statistical Yearbook 2000, Table 30. Notes: These refugees were admitted under the following 
programmes (total number in parentheses): Presidential Directive of 12/22/45 (40,324); Displaced Persons Act 
of 6/25/48 (409,696); Orphan Act of 7/29/53 (466); Refugee Relief Act of 8/7/53 (189,025); Refugee-Escapee 
Act of 9/11/57 (29,462); Hungarian Refugee Act of 7/25/58 (30,752); Azores & Netherlands Refugee Act of 
9/2/58 (22,213); Refugee Relatives Act of 9/22/59 (1,820); Fair Share Refugee Act of 7/14/60 (19,800); Refugee 
Conditional Entrants Act of 10/3/65 (142,103); Cuban Refugee Act of 11/2/66 (610,568); Indochinese Refugee 
Act of 10/28/77 (175,168); Refugee Parolee Act of 10/5/78 (139,294); Refugee Act of 1980, 3/17/80 
(1,682,203). See INS Statistical Yearbook 2000, Table 29.  
  
 1946-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90  1991-
2000 
Europe 211,983 456,146 55,235 71,858 155,512 426,565 
     W Europe 41,563 88,683 4,032 587 1,809 2,128 
     S Europe 779 93,121 7,259 6,170 2,564 1,242 
     E Europe 108,310 214,828 42,936 33,751 78,723 88,339 
     USSR 61,331 59,514 1,008 31,350 72,416 334,856 
Asia 1,106 33,422 19,895 210,683 712,092 351,347 
Africa 20 1,768 5,486 2,991 22,149 51,649 
Oceania 7 75 21 37 22 291 
Americas 195 905 132,191 253,877 123,826 191,190 
     N America 
     and Carib 
3 6 131,557 252,130 114,214 154,751 
     C America 160 825 511 503 7,626 30,582 
     S America 32 74 123 1,244 1,986 5,857 
     Unknown 36 55 15 1 19 224 
Total 213,347 492,371 212,843 539,447 1,013,620 1,021,266 
26 
 
Table 4: Admission Categories and Occupations in 1982 (percent) 
 All Europe Asia Africa & 
Oceania 
North 
America 
South 
America 
Class of admission (all immigrants) 
Employment preferences % 4.4 8.8 4.5 10.0 2.1 2.1 
Family preferences % 38.9 26.1 31.1 35.3 54.7 64.1 
Immediate relatives % 28.3 35.8 21.2 44.0 36.9 30.9 
Other admissions % 28.4 29.2 43.3 10.7 6.2 2.9 
Adult immigrants aged 16+ 
With labor certificate % 5.4 8.0 4.8 8.2 4.7 5.9 
With an occupation % 43.4 48.0 36.6 49.1 52.8 43.8 
Skilled % (labor certificate) 86.3 91.1 90.0 93.4 70.1 74.9 
Skilled % (occupation but 
no labor certificate) 
54.4 68.2 57.0 68.9 42.9 59.9 
  
Source: INS database for fiscal year 1982.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects Regressions for Immigration by Source Country 1972-1991 
 Total Stock 20 Year Stock 10 Year Stock 
Immigrant stock/source 
country population 
0.401 
(6.09) 
0.492 
(6.10) 
0.722 
(5.68) 
(Immigrant stock /pop)*GDP 
per capita in source country 
-0.024 
(6.69) 
-0.028 
(6.61) 
-0.041 
(6.36) 
GDP per capita in source 
country 
0.101 
(4.45) 
0.099 
(4.39) 
0.137 
(4.28) 
Share aged 20-34 tertiary 
educated in source country  
0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.012 
(0.16) 
-0.041 
(0.53) 
Total fertility rate (lagged) in 
source country  
0.623 
(1.46) 
0.601 
(1.44) 
0.680 
(1.63) 
Western hemisphere dummy   
for 1972-8 
1.605 
(1.38) 
1.634 
(1.47) 
2.633 
(2.04) 
R2 (within) 0.468 0.679 0.694 
Countries 102 102 102 
Observations 408 408 408 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by source country.   
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Table 6: Instrumental Variables Regressions for Total Immigration 
 Total Stock 20 Year Stock 10 Year Stock 
Immigrant stock/source 
country population 
0.602 
(4.81) 
0.789 
(5.01) 
1.268 
(4.96) 
(Immigrant stock /pop)*GDP 
per capita in source country 
-0.058 
(4.18) 
-0.075 
(4.29) 
-0.122 
(4.10) 
GDP per capita in source 
country 
0.310 
(2.88) 
0.351 
(3.00) 
0.519 
(3.31) 
Share aged 20-34 tertiary 
educated in source country  
0.007 
(0.04) 
-0.012 
(0.06) 
-0.050 
(0.25) 
Total fertility rate (lagged) in 
source country  
-0.158 
(0.25) 
-0.173 
(0.26) 
-0.071 
(0.10) 
Western hemisphere dummy   
for 1972-8 
3.421 
(2.46) 
3.765 
(2.47) 
4.716 
(3.05) 
R2 (within) 0.198 0.200 0.216 
Countries 102 102 102 
Observations 408 408 408 
 
 
Table 7: Regressions for Immigration by Class of Admission 
 Employment 
preferences 
Family 
preferences 
Immediate 
family 
Other 
immigrants 
Immigrant stock/source 
country population 
0.007 
(1.28) 
0.560 
(3.11) 
0.212 
(6.86) 
-0.057 
(0.48) 
(Immigrant stock /pop)*GDP 
per capita in source country 
0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.015 
(1.74) 
-0.008 
(6.70) 
-0.018 
(3.24) 
GDP per capita in source 
country 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.041 
(1.23) 
0.023 
(4.20) 
0.072 
(2.80) 
Share aged 20-34 tertiary 
educated in source country  
0.006 
(1.60) 
-0.113 
(1.57) 
0.14 
(0.70) 
0.052 
(0.88) 
Total fertility rate (lagged) in 
source country  
-0.008 
(0.48) 
0.448 
(1.10) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.237 
(0.60) 
Western Hemisphere 
dummy   for 1972-8 
0.034 
(0.91) 
5.18 
(3.24) 
0.609 
(1.91) 
-3.192 
(2.91) 
R2 (within) 0.293 0.546 0.680 0.374 
Countries 102 102 102 102 
Observations 408 408 408 408 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by source country. 
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Table 8: Immigration Multipliers 
 All regions Europe Asia Americas Africa/ 
Oceania 
Original immigration 100 100 100 100 100 
Additional immigrants resulting from a temporary increase immigration 
     After five years 25.8 13.1 40.2 44.1 48.7 
     After ten years 32.5 14.8 56.3 63.5 72.4 
     After twenty years  34.7 15.1 65.4 75.8 89.6 
Additional immigrants resulting from a sustained increase in immigration 
     After five years 125.8 113.1 140.2 158.5 148.1 
     After ten years 142.1 120.5 168.3 204.8 183.7 
     After twenty years  195.5 142.9 269.6 292.7 317.8 
 
Note: The figures in the upper panel are obtained by summing over time applying iteratively the relationship 
from the third column of Table 5 above: ΔMt+1 = (0.722 – 0.0041×GDP) ΔMt where M is migration over a five 
year period and GDP is average GDP per capita between 1970 and 1985. These are unweighted averages for 
the countries in the dataset. Those in the lower panel cumulate the immigration flow starting with two periods 
with immigration raised by 100, to reflect the 10-year stock. Here the equation is: Mt+1 = (0.722 – 
0.0041×GDP)*0.5(Mt +Mt-1). 
 
Figure 1: Immigrants Admitted Within and Outside the Numerical Limit 1953 to 1991.  
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1985 and 1991, Table IMM 1.4 and Annual Reports for 1955, 1960 and 1965 Table 
4. Note: The fiscal year changed to from end June to end September in 1976; the third quarter of 1976 
(reported separately in the source) has been omitted. The total excludes those admitted under the Refugee 
Act 1980 and legalisations in 1989-91 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 1986. 
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